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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Scope
This memorandum discusses each of the “chapeau” elements of crimes against humanity,
namely the interpretation of the terms “widespread,” “systematic,” “attack,” “civilian,”
“population,” and “on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds.”* Because the
language “on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds” is rarely found in the
context of crimes against humanity, and because it can be interpreted in multiple ways, special
attention is paid to that element. In addition, this memorandum discusses the relationship
between the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity and the enumerated acts as set forth in
Article 5 of the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers (“ECCC Statute”).
B. Summary of Conclusions
i. The term “widespread or systematic attack” means that the attack must
be either on a vast scale or in furtherance of a State or organizational
policy.
The term “widespread” means only that the attack must be on a “vast scale,” meaning
either the commission of multiple acts or the presence of a large number of victims. The term
“systematic” means that the attack was perpetrated as part of a methodical plan. The term
“attack” means simply that any one of the enumerated acts were committed. While the “attack”
must be proven in either instance, only one of the “widespread or systematic” elements need be
proven to satisfy the chapeau’s requirements.
ii. The term “civilian population” means that a specific group of people
must be targeted and that the majority of those people are noncombatants.
The term “population” simply means that the crimes must be of a collective nature and to
include a larger body of victims than that caused by isolated acts. Due to the “on national,
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political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds” language, however, the population must be
targeted due to the enumerated discriminatory grounds in the chapeau.
Based on customary international law, the term “civilian” should be broadly interpreted
by the ECCC, including people who may have held arms at one point or another, so long as they
weren’t actively involved in a resistance at the time of the attack. At the same time, the fact that
the target of an attack may have included combatants does not preclude the finding that the
population was “civilian.”
iii. The attack must also be in furtherance of a State or organizational plan
or policy, as mandated by customary international law.
The Office of the While the ECCC Statute does not explicitly require that the attack be in
furtherance of a State or organizational plan or policy, the requirement has been a consistent
element in customary international law and is also required by the Rome Statute. The policy or
plan does not have to be that of a State though, and the requirement can be satisfied so long as
the organization has a formulated plan and is able to move freely within a defined territory.
iv. The phrase “on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds”
refers to the “attack” and not any of the enumerated acts, therefore not
increasing the level of intent that the prosecution need prove.
The ECCC should acknowledge that the burden faced by the Office of the Prosecution is
not heightened by the inclusion of the phrase “on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious
grounds” in the ECCC Statute. The interpretation that the discrimination element requires a
specific level of intent has been discussed by both the ICTY and the ICTR, and both have found
that there is no such requirement. Instead, both ad hoc tribunals have determined that, instead of
increasing the level of intent required on behalf of the perpetrator, both the language and
customary international law lead to a conclusion that it is the “attack” that must be
discriminatory, not the “act.”
8

v. The mens rea needed to be proven in regards to that of the chapeau
elements is that of “knowledge,” and knowledge may be proven through
the use of circumstantial evidence.
As has been developed through customary international law, and as explicitly pronounced
in the Rome Statute, the applicable mens rea to the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity
is that of knowledge. Knowledge, however, need not be proven directly, and “constructive
knowledge” satisfies the knowledge requirement. As a result, the prosecution is able to use any
circumstantial evidence to show that the accused would have had knowledge of the attack.

II. BACKGROUND
Under Article 5 of the ECC Statute, “[the] Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power
to bring to trial all Suspects who committed crimes against humanity during the period 17 April
1975 to 6 January 1979.”1 “Crimes against humanity” are then defined as: “any acts committed
as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, on national, political,
ethnical, racial or religious grounds, such as:
•

murder;

•

extermination;

•

enslavement;

•

deportation;

*What are the requirements of the proof of the chapeau elements in article 5 of the ECCC Law
pertaining to Crimes Against Humanity? What is the connection, if any, of these requirements
with the proof of the substantive crimes enumerated in that article? In answering this question,
please refer to Article 9 of the UN-Cambodia Agreement that describes that the ECCC shall
charge Crimes Against Humanity as defined in the Rome Statute of the ICC.
1

Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments as
promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 4]
9

•

imprisonment;

•

torture;

•

rape;

•

persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds;

•

other inhumane acts.”2

This memo will discuss what are known as the chapeau elements of crimes against
humanity. Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman3 explains best the concept of the chapeau elements
when she writes:
The chapeau elements are those contained in the first paragraph of the definition
of crimes against humanity, as distinct from the enumerated acts listed underneath
the chapeau. Crimes against humanity involve the commission of one or more
inhumane acts as well as the fulfillment of the chapeau elements of the crime. In
order to prove the commission of a crime against humanity, a prosecutor must
demonstrate that the accused has committed the elements of the enumerated, such
as murder, torture, or rape. In addition, the prosecutor must prove the elements
required by the chapeau of crimes against humanity…The chapeau elements are
crucial since they elevate what would otherwise constitute a crime under domestic
jurisdiction to an act of international concern.”4

2

Id.

3

Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman Professor deGuzman is a graduate of Yale Law School, the
Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, and Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service.
She was a Fulbright Scholar in Senegal and is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the Irish Center for
Human Rights of the National University of Ireland. Margaret deGuzman also served as a legal
advisor to the Senegal delegation at the Rome Conference on the International Criminal Court.
Most recently, Professor deGuzman taught international human rights law at Georgetown
University's Institute for International Law and Politics. She is currently involved in expert
groups drafting a convention on crimes against humanity and general rules and principles of
international criminal procedure.
4

Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman, The Road from Rome: The Developing Law of Crimes
Against Humanity, Human Rights Quarterly 22 (2000) 335-403, 337, FN 5 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 29].
10

Under the ECCC Statute, those chapeau elements are: (1) a widespread or systematic attack; (2)
against a civilian population; (3) on national, political, ethnical, racial, or religious grounds.
Each of these elements will be discussed in turn. In particular, attention will be paid to elements
that have been considered necessary by other tribunals, as well as elements that are a part of the
ECCC Statute that are not typical of crimes against humanity definitions, namely the “on
national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds” language.

III. THE CHAPEAU ELEMENTS
A. WIDESPREAD OR SYSTEMATIC ATTACK
The most important of the chapeau elements is that the attack be “widespread or
systematic.”5 It is the “widespread or systematic” element that transforms a domestic crime into
one subject to international concern and jurisdiction and “into attacks against humanity rather
than isolated violations of the rights of particular individuals.”6
The concept of a “widespread or systematic attack” has long been a part of the definition
of crimes against humanity.7 Still, the ICTR Statute was the first binding international legal

“One of the distinguishing features of ‘crimes against humanity’ is their pattern of occurrence.
The ‘widespread or systematic’ requirement is fundamental in distinguishing crimes against
humanity from common crimes, which do not rise to the level of crimes under international law.”
Mohamed Elewa Badar, From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Defining The
Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 5 San Diego Int’l L. J. 73, 109 (2004) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
5

6

deGuzman, supra note 4, at 375

“All of the State negotiators agreed that inhumane acts had to pass a certain threshold to
become a crime against humanity in the international setting. Criminalization of murder, for
instance, was not the issue. Instead, the issue was determining at what point the international
community had the right and the obligation to step in and prosecute murders committed by an
actor. One group of States initially argued for the approach taken by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which had no statutory jurisdictional threshold. However,
the delegates eventually agreed that the threshold test should incorporate terms used in previous
7
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instrument to include the language “widespread or systematic attack” in its definition,8 and the
Rome Statute followed the ICTR’s example. Therefore, the interpretations of the ICTR and the
Rome Statute provide the most relevant precedent to the ECCC and may be seen as the most
persuasive authority on the “widespread or systematic” requirement.
In order to satisfy the “widespread or systematic attack” requirement, “it is instructive to
isolate four elements of this concept: the definitions of ‘widespread or systematic’ and ‘attack,’
and what has have come to be called the ‘policy’ and ‘nexus’ requirements.”9 These different
elements will be discussed in turn.
i. Widespread
The term “widespread” refers to the number of victims, whereas the term “systematic”
refers to the existence of a policy or plan.10 “Widespread” can be defined as “massive, frequent,
large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a
multiplicity of victims.”11 As the International Law Commission (“ILC”) Draft Code has
explained,
The second alternative requires that the inhumane acts be committed on a large
scale meaning that the acts are directed against a multiplicity of victims….The
jurisprudence and commentary, namely ‘widespread’ and ‘systematic.’” Catherine R. Blanchet,
Some Troubling Elements In The Treaty Language Of The Rome Statute Of The International
Criminal Court, 24 Mich. J. Int’l L. 647, 655 (2003) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 25]. See also Badar, supra note 5, at 109 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
24]
8

deGuzman, supra note 4, at 364 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29]

9

Simon Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes Against
Humanity, 10 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 307, 314 (2000) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 28]
10

Badar, supra note 5, at 109. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24]

11

Id.
12

Nuremberg Tribunal further emphasized that the policy of terror was ‘certainly
carried out on a vast scale’ in its consideration of inhumane acts as possible
crimes against humanity….The term ‘large scale’ in the present text…is
sufficiently broad to cover various situations involving multiplicity of victims, for
example, as a result of the cumulative effect of a series of inhumane acts or the
singular effect of an inhumane act of extraordinary magnitude.12
In most situations involving alleged crimes against humanity, the presence of inhumane
acts on a vast scale is almost commonplace. For example, in the Saddam Hussein trial,
Trial Chamber I analyzed whether the “widespread” element was met during the attack
on residents of Ad-Dujayl. In its analysis, the Trial Chamber held that the attack was
widespread because it was “taken over by military forces for several days, a sizeable
percentage of its population was arrested (and later detained and executed), and the
ultimate penalties against the population were inflicted over a several year period.”13
And while the Rome Statute does require that there be “multiple commission[s] of [the
enumerated] acts,”14 certainly the Khmer Rouge’s unlawful arrests, torture, and murder of
thousands of people over a period of almost four years would satisfy the “vast scale”
requirement.

12

Draft Code Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in report of International Law
Commission, commentary section, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/51/10
(1996) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21]
13

Eric H. Blinderman, Anniversary Contributions: International Criminal Law: The Conviction
of Saddam Hussein for the Crime Against Humanity of “Other Inhumane Acts,” 30 U. Pa. J. Int’l
L. 1239, 1252-53 (2009) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26]
14

While the Rome Statute requires the commission of multiple acts, customary international law
does not. As an example, the execution by Soviet authorities of Hungarian leader Imre Nagy
was a crime against humanity despite the fact that there was only one victim. Even though the
inhumane act was not on a “vast scale,” the fact that it was a political leader meant that the goal
was to injure an entire population. See Badar, supra note 8 at 110 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 24]
13

ii. Systematic
As mentioned briefly above15, the term “systematic” “refers to a pattern of conduct or
methodical plan.”16 As the ILC explained in its Draft Code:
The first alternative requires that the inhumane acts be committed in a systematic
manner meaning pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy. The implementation
of this plan or policy could result in the repeated or continuous commission of
inhumans acts…the Nuremberg Tribunal emphasized that the inhumane acts were
committed as a part of the policy of terror and were ‘in many cases…organized
[and] systemic’ in considering whether such acts constituted crimes against
humanity.17
The Trial Chambers in Prosecutor v. Tadic expanded on this definition, writing that the term
“systematic” requires “thoroughly organized and following a regular pattern on the basis of a
common policy involving substantial public or private resources.”18 In that sense, the
“systematic” element is closely related to the policy requirement,19 where “it is not the single
killing that is targeted, but mass killings, unless the single killing can be linked to a ‘systematic’
policy or to ‘widespread’ attacks.”20
iii. Attack

15

See infra p.13

16

Id. at 111 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24]

17

Draft Code Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, supra note 12 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 21]
18

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, at para. 648 (May 7, 1997)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18]
19

See infra pp. 22-25

20

Badar, supra note 8, at 111-12 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24], citing M
Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law 62, 196-199 (2d. rev.
ed., 1999)
14

The term “attack” can be “can be described as a course of conduct involving the
commission of acts of violence,” a somewhat different interpretation than under the laws of
war.21 As explained by the ICTY Trial Chamber II in Kunarac:
the term ‘attack’ in the context of a crime against humanity is not limited to the
conduct of hostilities. It may also include situations of mistreatment of persons
taking no active part in hostilities, such as someone in detention. However, both
terms are based on a similar assumption, namely that war should be a matter
between armed forces or armed groups and that the civilian population cannot be
a legitimate target.22
While the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY
Statute”) contains the requirement that the crimes be committed “in armed conflict,”23 the Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR Statute”) and the ECCC Statute
contain no such requirements.24 Nor, moreover, is the “armed conflict” a necessary element of
crimes against humanity in the ICTR or ECCC Statutes.
In Akayesu, the ICTR Trial Chamber I held that “an attack may be defined as an unlawful
act of the kind enumerated in the ICTR Statute, like murder, extermination, etc., noting that an
attack may be non-violent in nature.” 25 The ICTR Trial Chamber II in Kayihema held similarly,
21

Id. at 105

22

Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/I-T, at para. 416 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 15]
“The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the
following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in
character, and directed against any civilian population….” Statute of the Int’l Criminal Trib. For
the Former Yugoslavia, U.N.S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217 mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993), Art. 5. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
23

24

See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by Security Council on 8
November 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
7]; ECCC Statute, supra note 1 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4]
25

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, at para. 581 (Sept. 2, 1998)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
15

that an “attack” is simply “an event that encompasses the enumerated crimes.”26 This view that
an attack is simply any of the enumerated acts is also widely held among scholars of customary
international law.27 The ECCC, as well, should adopt this interpretation of the term “attack.”
Certainly, the Khmer Rouge’s attack encompassed multiple commissions of the enumerated acts
and, hence, the “attack” requirement should be easily satisfied.
B. ON A CIVILIAN POPULATION
All codifications of the definition of crimes against humanity have included the
requirement that the attack be committed against a civilian population.28 The term “civilian”
requires that the attack be committed against noncombatants,29 whereas the term “population”
requires that a large number of civilians must be targeted.30 The definitions of “civilian” and
“population,” however, are somewhat murky within the context of international law.
i. Civilian

26

Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, at para. 122 (May 21, 1999)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
27

See Badar, supra note 5, at 108 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24]
(“Generally speaking, the concept of an ‘attack’ may be defined as an unlawful act as the kind
enumerated in Articles 5(a) to (i) and 3(a) to (i) of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, respectively.”)
28

deGuzman, supra note 4, at 360 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29]

29

Badar, supra note 5, at 101 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24], citing La
Documentation Internationale, La Paix de Versailles, Vol. 3, Responsibilities des auteurs de la
Guerre et Sanctions, Paris, 1930, Annex I to the main report, quoted in U.N. War Crimes
Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of
the Laws of War, 193 (1948)
30

Id. at 104 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24]
16

It is generally agreed that crimes against humanity must be committed against civilians
rather than combatants.31 In reference to Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, for example, the
UNWCC stated that “the words ‘civilian population’ appear to indicate that crimes against
humanity are restricted to inhumane acts committed against civilians as opposed to members of
the armed forces.”32 However, what constitutes a “civilian” is not entirely clear.33 As Margaret
McAuliffe deGuzman34 explains, “the lines between combatants and noncombatants become
particularly murky in internal conflicts where the warring factions are not under the control of
governments. In the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, for example, large
networks of persons not formally enlisted in an army were actively involved in the conflict.”35
In its analysis of the “civilian target” element of crimes against humanity, the
Commission of Experts on the ICTY wrote that the term:
“should not lead to any quick conclusions concerning people who at one
particular point in time did bear arms….A head of family who…tries to protect
his family gun-in-hand does not thereby lose his status as a civilian. Maybe the
same is the case for the sole policeman or local defence guard doing the same,
even if they joined hands to try to prevent the cataclysm….[T]he distinction
between improvised self-defence and actual military defence may be subtle, but
none the less important. This is no less so when the legitimate authorities in the

31

Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to the Security Council
Resolution 780, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Soc. S/1994/674 (1994) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 22] (holding that the term “any civilian population” principally
applies to non-combatants)
32

Badar, supra note 5, at 101 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24]

33

deGuzman, supra note 4, at 361 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29]

34

At the time of the Article, Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman was a law clerk to the Honorable
James. R. Browning of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. She earned a JD. From Yale Law
School, an M.A.L.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomay and a BSFS from
Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.
35

deGuzman, supra note 8, at 361 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29],
17

area – as part and parcel of an overall plan of destruction – had previously been
given an ultimatum to arm all the local defence guards.”36
The jurisprudence of both the ICTY and the ICTR have also led to the conclusion that the term
“civilian” should be interpreted broadly rather than narrowly.37
In one example of this broad interpretation of the term “civilian,” the ICTY Trial
Chamber in Msksic held in its decision that “although crimes against humanity must target a
civilian population, individuals who at one time performed acts of resistance may in certain
circumstances be victims of crimes against humanity.”38 The French Cour de Cassation has held
the same, writing in the Barbie decision that “members of the Resistance could be victims of
crimes against humanity as long as the necessary intent for crimes against humanity was
present.”39
The decisions of the ICTR are also particularly illustrative, as the ICTR has discussed
specifically “whether a civilian population may lose its character as civilian if there are certain
non-civilians present.”40 In Musema,41 Akayesu,42 and Rutaganda,43 the ICTR has held that “the
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Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 31 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 22]
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See Guenael Mettraux, Crimes Against Humanity In The Jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 Harv. Int’l L.J. 237, 257
(2002) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31]
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Badar, supra note 5, at 102 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24] (citing
Prosecutor v. Mile Msksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin, Case No. IT-95-13-R 61,
Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules and Procedure and Evidence, at para.
29 (April 3, 1996)
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French Cour de Cassation, Federation Nationale des Deportes et Internes Resistants et
Patriotes v. Barbie, quoted in Tadic, supra note 18, at para. 641 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 18]
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Badar, supra note 5, at 102 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24]
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fact that there are certain individuals among the civilian population who are not civilians does
not deprive the population of its civilian character.” Therefore, the attack must target
predominately civilians, but not all victims or targets must be civilian. Moreover, “a person shall
be considered to be a civilian for as long as there is a doubt as to his or her statuts.”44
Thus based on customary international law, the term “civilian” should be broadly
interpreted by the ECCC, including people who may have held arms at one point or another, so
long as they weren’t actively involved in a resistance at the time of the attack. At the same time,
the fact that the target of an attack may have included combatants does not preclude the finding
that the population was “civilian.”
ii. Population
There are also differing interpretations as to the term “population.” One interpretation is
that the term “population” is “merely another way of stating the requirement of a ‘widespread or
systematic’ attack, meaning simply that “crimes against humanity do not encompass isolated acts
but require a broader context.”45
Beginning with the Nuremberg Charter, the term “population” “indicates that a larger
body of victims is visualized and that single or isolated acts committed against individuals are
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Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment, at para. 207 (Jan. 27, 2000)
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outside the scope.”46 This interpretation has been fairly continuous in the context of
international law. The Trial Chamber in the Tadic judgment, for example, wrote:
The requirement in Article 5 of the Statute that the prohibited acts must be
directed against a civilian “population” does not mean that the entire population
of a given State or territory must be victimized by these acts in order for the acts
to constitute crimes against humanity. Instead, the “population” element is
intended to imply crimes of a collective nature and thus exclude single or isolated
acts which, although possibly constituting war crimes or crimes against national
penal legislation, do not rise to the level of crimes against humanity.47
The Tadic judgment is consistent with the interpretation of the term “population” among
international scholars, who have held that a “population” is “a sizeable group of people who
possess some distinctive features that mark them as targets of the attack.”48 In that sense,
“randomly or fortuitously assembled”49 groups, “such as a crowd at a football game,”50 would
not be considered a population.
However, the ICTY Statute does not contain the same “attack on a civilian population on
national, political, ethnical, racial, or religious grounds” language as does the ECCC Statute.51
As Mohamed Elewa Badar52 explains,
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Badar, supra note 5, at 104 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24] citing Egon
Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 Brit. Year Book of Int'l L. 179, 188 (1946)
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Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 18, at para. 644 (May 7, 1997) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 18]. But compare with para. 649, where the Trial Chamber wrote: “Clearly, a
single act by a perpetrator taken within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population entails criminal responsibility, and an individual need not commit numerous
offences to be held liable.”
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Guenael Mettraux, supra note 37, at 255 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31]
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“It has been observed that the term ‘population’ as employed in the ICTR Statute
[and ECCC statute] as part of the phrase “attack against any civilian population
on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds” may be interpreted as
requiring the targeted population to represent a specific group. This interpretation
is contrary to the humanitarian law’s definition, where the ‘civilian population
comprises all persons who are civilians.’”53
As is discussed infra pages 25-38 (Part C – On National, Political, Ethnical, Racial, or Religious
Grounds), this analysis is correct, and the inclusion of the “on national, political, ethnical, racial
or religious grounds” language does conflict with the typical crimes against humanity definition.
Therefore, for the ECCC, the requirement of a “population” entails not only that the crimes be of
a collective nature, but also that the attack (and not the individual act) must be on discriminatory
grounds, i.e., that a specific group of people are targeted by the attack.
iii. Policy Requirement
While the ECCC does not explicitly state that the attack must be in furtherance of a
policy, that requirement has nonetheless become an essential element of customary international
law, and one that would have been essential during the period of Democratic Kampuchea as
well. Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter did not explicitly contain a policy requirement, but
“the Nuremberg judgment provided a short descriptive passage which emphasized the ‘policy of
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International Legal Relations, Ain Shams University, Cairo, 1999; LL.B. & Bachelor's of Police
Sciences, Police Academy, Police College, 1991.
52

53

Badar, supra note 5, at 105 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24]
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terror’ and ‘policy of persecution, repression, and murder of civilians.”54 Since that time,
national courts have interpreted the elements of crimes against humanity to include such an
element.55
More recently, the ICTY has interpreted the phrase “directed against any civilian
population” to mean “that the acts must occur on a widespread or systematic basis, that there
must be some form of governmental, organization or group policy to commit these acts.”56 The
ICTR has written that “for an attack against a civilian population to pass the threshold required
by the definition of the crime against humanity, it is necessary to prove the existence of a prior
plan or policy.”57 And while there exists the possibility that, under customary international law,
the policy requirement is only necessary to prove a crime against humanity if the attack is
systematic, rather than widespread,58 the Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute negate this
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Id. at 112

“For instance, the French Cour de Cassation in the Barbie and Touvier cases required that ‘the
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112-13.
55

56

Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 18, at para. 644 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 18].
57

Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 26, at para. 124 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 26].
“…the existence of a policy or plan may be evidentially relevant, but is not a legal element of
the crimes.”Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-1/A, Judgment, at para. 98 (June 12,
2002) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].
58

22

possibility.59 In the introduction to the section on crimes against humanity, paragraph 3 of the
Elements of Crimes remarks:
“Attack directed against a civilian population’ in these context elements is
understood to mean a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of
acts referred to in article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute against any civilian
population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to
commit such attack. The acts need not constitute a military attack. It is
understood that ‘policy to commit such attack’ requires that the State or
organization actively promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian
population.”60
The Elements of Crimes also clarifies that not only an active policy of a state may meet this
requirement, but also that inaction aimed at encouraging an attack may also satisfy the element.61
However, despite the Elements of Crimes’ use of the word “State,” the policy need not be
that of a “State” to satisfy the requirement. The 1996 ILC Draft Code states that the policy
requirement could be satisfied when “instigated or directed by a Government or by any
organization or group.”62 The ICTY’s Tadic and Kupreski cases have held similarly, that “the
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Id. at FN 6, “A policy which has a civilian population as the object of the attack would be
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law or in relation to crimes against humanity has developed to take into account forces which
although not those of the legitimate government, have de facto control over, or are able to move
freely within, defined territory”63 and that such a policy does not have to be “explicitly
formulated nor need it be the policy of a State.”64 Therefore, as a matter of customary
international law, while a policy must be proven, it need not be the policy of State, but can be the
policy of any organization or entity.
Thus, while the ECCC Statute does not explicitly contain a requirement that the attack
must be in furtherance of a plan or policy, customary international law mandates that the element
be included. However, the plan or policy need not be that of a State, and any organization or
entity which has the ability to move freely within the territory can satisfy the policy requirement.

C. ON NATIONAL, POLITICAL, ETHNICAL, RACIAL, OR RELIGIOUS
GROUNDS
i. A History of the Discrimination Element

conduct on the part of a single individual would not constitute a crime against humanity….The
instigation or direction of a Government or any organization or group, which may not be
affiliated with a Government, gives the act its great dimension and makes it as a crime against
humanity imputable to private persons or agents of a State.” Badar, supra note 5, at 112-113
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24], citing Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at
95-96, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
63

Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 18, at para. 654 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 18].
64
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The Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of the Major War
Criminals was signed in 1945 as an appendix to the London Agreement.65 It was under this
Charter that “crimes against humanity” originated.66 From the beginning, there was a
discrimination element. However, the discrimination element was there presented as a part of
the crime against humanity of “persecution” and was not meant to be a requisite element of the
other enumerated offenses.67 Thus, IMT Article 6(c) defined crimes against humanity as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.68
[Emphasis added]. According to the ILC, established in 1947 for “the promotion of the
progressive development of international law and its codification,”69 Article 6(c) contained two
distinctly separate types of crimes against humanity.70 One category encompassed “murder,
extermination…and other inhumane acts” while the other encompassed “persecutions on
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political, racial or religious grounds….”71 In this ILC interpretation of the language, the
discrimination element was not a requirement for all crimes against humanity, but was a modifier
for the specific crime of persecution.
While, for a time, there existed a controversy over the discrimination element due to
issues with the translation into other languages,72 the United Nations issued an analysis during
the Trial of the Major War Criminals, seemingly putting the controversy to rest.73 In that
analysis, the U.N. explicitly stated that the discrimination element only referred to the specific
crime of persecution, writing:
It might perhaps be argued that the phrase "on political, racial or religious
grounds" refers not only to persecutions but also to the first type of crimes against
humanity. The British Chief Prosecutor possibly held that opinion as he spoke of
"murder, extermination, enslavement, persecution on political racial or religious
ground. This interpretation, however, seems hardly to be warranted by the English
wording and still less by the French text . . . Moreover, in its statement with
regard to von Schirach's guilt the Court designated the crimes against humanity
as "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts"
and "persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds.74
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Interestingly enough, the confusion over a discrimination element began almost immediately.
The London Agreement had been written in English, French, and Russian, each having equal
authenticity.73 As Mohamed Elewa Badar explains, “The discrepancy which was found to exist
was this: in the English and the French texts, Article 6(c) was divided into two parts by a
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[Emphasis added]. The International Law Commission agreed with the U.N.’s analysis as well.75
The U.N. “[entrusted] the formulation of the principles of international law recognized in
the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal to the ILC”76 from
the ILC’s inception. In 1950, the ILC completed the Nuremberg Principles. Principle VI(c),
defined crimes against humanity as:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done
against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution
of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime. [emphasis
added]77
Again, the discrimination element was deemed to apply only to the crime of persecution and was
not seen as a required element for the rest of the crimes against humanity. As a result of the
ILC’s formulation, the question of a discrimination element was essentially dismissed for the
next fifty years.78
It was not until the creation of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes in 1993 and 1994,
respectively, that the discrimination element once again became a source of controversy. The
two statutes differed, as the ICTR Statute explicitly required a form of discrimination as part of
its chapeau elements whereas the ICTY Statute did not. Still, while the ICTY and ICTR Statutes
differed in their language, the creation of the tribunals had “paved the way for the development
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of a body of international jurisprudence on crimes against humanity, which helped guide the
delegations assembled at the Rome Conference.”79 Article 7 of the Rome Statute reads:
For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental principle of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparative gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph
3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph
or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.80
There was controversy in the delegations over whether a discriminatory intent should be required
as part of the Rome Statute. As Darryl Robinson, a former advisor to the Chief Prosecutor at the
ICC, has explained: “All participants agreed that the specific crime of persecution required a
discriminatory motive (as discrimination is the essence of the crime of persecution), but the
majority maintained that not all crimes against humanity required a discriminatory motive.”81 As

Darryl Robinson, Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference, The
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, No. 1 (Jan. 1999), pp. 43-57 at 45 [Reproduced
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Robinson, supra note 79 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32]; See also Badar,
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evidenced, the only requirement for discriminatory grounds in the Rome Statute relates to the
specific crime of persecution.
Since Article 9 of the U.N.-Cambodia Agreement specifies that “the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers shall be…crimes against humanity as defined in the
1998 Rome State of the International Criminal Court,”82 there would an inherent contradiction if
Article 5 of the ECCC Statute did not contain the same individual requirements as Article 7 of
the Rome Statute. To determine whether that contradiction exists and, if so, how to overcome it,
the discrimination element found in Article 5 of the ECCC must first be interpreted.
The discriminatory grounds requirement can be interpreted in two separate ways. The
first is that the “act” must be committed with a discriminatory intent, i.e., that the acts of murder,
extermination, enslavement, etc. be committed on “national, political, ethnical, racial or religious
grounds.” The second interpretation is that the “attack” must be committed on discriminatory
grounds, i.e., that the widespread or systematic attack must be committed “on national, political,
ethnical, racial, or religious grounds.” As Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman explains in an article
in Human Rights Quarterly:

notably France, suggested that crimes against humanity required an element of discrimination
(for example, they must be committed on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds)
as contained in the ICTR statute. However, the overwhelming majority of delegations were
opposed to this requirement. The opponents expressed their view that the inclusion of such a
criterion would complicate the task of the Prosecution by significantly increasing its burden of
proof in requiring evidence of such a subjective element, and that crimes against humanity could
be committed against other groups including intellectuals, and social, cultural or political groups,
since the definition of genocide might not be expanded to cover them. In the view of the
majority, customary international law required a discriminatory element only for the inhuman act
of ‘persecution,’ and not for other ‘crimes against humanity.’ The view of the majority not to
include a discriminatory ground of all crimes against humanity meets the criteria elaborated
within international law and practice.”)
82

U.N.-Cambodia Agreement, supra note 59, at Art. 9 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 1]
29

Confusingly, the discrimination element is subject to two rather different
interpretations. First, this element may be viewed in relation to the subjective
mental state of the perpetrator – what the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor has
termed “discriminatory intent.” This interpretation would require that each
individual perpetrator act with a specific intent to discriminate. A discriminatory
intent requirement would mean that the perpetrator’s purpose in attacking the
victim would transcend the individual victim; the perpetrator would need to have
a specific purpose to attack the group to which the victim belongs.
A second way to interpret the discrimination element is in relation to the
widespread or systematic attack – what the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor has
termed “discriminatory grounds.” A discriminatory grounds requirement would
mean that the broader attack within which an individual’s act occurs must be
targeted against a particular group. While the individual actor might have purely
personal motives, the attack itself would have a discriminatory purpose. This
requirement would have no effect on the mental element of the individual
perpetrator. A requirement of discriminatory grounds would constitute a
jurisdictional element; in order for a court to exercise jurisdiction over a situation
as a crime against humanity, the widespread or systematic attack would have to be
directed against a particular group.83
Thus, the interpretation of Article 5 of the ECCC Statute will not only determine whether a
contradiction exists with Article 7 of the Rome Statute, but will directly affect what must be
proven by the Office of the Co-Prosecutors in order to obtain a conviction.
Article 7 of the Rome Convention does not contain a discriminatory requirement.84
However, several international tribunals either have the requirement within their respective
statutes or have discussed whether such a requirement might stem from customary international
law. As “[the] Statute of the ICTR is the only international instrument to explicitly require
discrimination for the commission of crimes against humanity,”85 this Part III(C) will focus
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mainly on the opinions and case law stemming from the ICTR decisions as evidence of how to
interpret the discriminatory grounds requirement.86
ii. Case Law of the ICTR and Prosecutor v. Akayesu
“Apart from the ICTR Statute, no international legal instrument defining crimes against
humanity includes a discrimination element.”87 Article 3 of the ICTR Statute states:
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic,
racial or religious grounds:
a) Murder;
b) Extermination;
c) Enslavement;
d) Deportation;
e) Imprisonment;
f) Torture;
g) Rape;
h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
i) Other inhumane acts. [emphasis added]88
As evidenced directly above, the ICTR Statute is (absent the introduction) identical to that of the
ECCC. As the ICTR was faced with the same issue of how the statute should be interpreted, and
why it should be interpreted that way, the writings of the Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber
serve as valuable insight both into how to interpret the ECCC Statute and also into why it should
be interpreted in such a manner.
The seminal ICTR case in the interpretation of the “discrimination element” is the case of
Prosecutor v. Akayesu.89 Jean Paul Akayesu was indicted on seven counts of crimes against
86
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Incoherence, 37. Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 787 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
33].
87

Id. at 365.

88

ICTR Statute, supra note 24, at art. 3 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7].
31

humanity, among other crimes, for the specific acts of murder, extermination, rape, torture, and
other inhumane acts.90 In its determination of the elements of crimes against humanity, the Trial
Chamber actually discussed at length the historical progression of crimes against humanity and
came to the conclusion that crimes against humanity could be broken down into four separate
elements. Those elements were:
(i) the act must be inhumane in nature and character, causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health;
(ii) the act must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack;
(iii) the act must be committed against members of the civilian population;
(iv) the act must be committed on one or more discriminatory grounds, namely,
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.91
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Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. IT-96-4-A, Judgment (June 1, 2001) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 11]. See also: Paul J. Magnarella, Some Milestones and
Achievements at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The 1998 Kambada and
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While the Trial Chamber did reach the conclusion that “the act must be committed on one or
more discriminatory grounds,” its manner of arriving at this conclusion is somewhat ambiguous.
Perhaps ironically, much of the history that the Trial Chamber cites in deriving this conclusion
seems to directly contradict the proposition that the “act” (and not merely the “attack”) must be
performed with a discriminatory intent. Most notably, seemingly in an explanation of the intent
required to be guilty of crimes against humanity, the Trial Chamber looked to the Eichmann
case, writing the following:
“In the Eichmann case, the accused, Otto Adolf Eichmann, was charged with offences
under Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (punishment) Law, 5710/1950, for his participation in the
implementation of the plan known as the Final Solution of the Jewish Problem’. Pursuant to
Section I (b) of the said law:
‘Crime against humanity means any of the following acts: murder, extermination,
enslavement, starvation or deportation and other inhumane acts committed against
any civilian population, and persecution on national, racial, religious or political
grounds.’
The district court in the Eichmann [case] stated that crimes against humanity differs from
genocide in that for the commission of genocide special intent is required. This special intent is
not required for crimes against humanity [emphasis added]. Eichmann was convicted by the
District court and sentenced to death. Eichmann appealed against his conviction and his appeal
was dismissed by the supreme court.
91
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[emphasis added]. However, while the elements as set forth by the Trial Chamber required the
“acts” of murder92 and rape93 to be conducted with a discriminatory intent, the elements of
extermination94 and torture95 required only that the “attack” be committed on discriminatory
grounds. Needless to say, the Office of the Co-Prosecutor objected to this interpretation, writing
in its Appellate Brief:
The Prosecution submits that if the ‘intention’ referred to is defined as including
the conscious desire of the perpetrator that his crime further the attack on the
group discriminated against, or knowledge or foresight that such a result is the
likely consequence of his actions, then this holding is correct. However, the
Prosecution submits that it contradicts other findings by the Trial Chamber
concerning murder and rape.”96
The Appeals Chamber, in its resulting Judgment, disagreed with the elements set forth by the
Trial Chamber and provided a much more thorough analysis as to why it is the “attack” (and not
the “act”) that must be committed on discriminatory grounds.
As explained by the Appeals Chamber:

The statute referenced by the Trial Chamber referred to “persecution on national, racial,
religious, or political grounds,” in much the same fashion as those statutes evinced in Part I.
Moreover, the Trial Chamber specifically recognized that “[the] special intent is not required for
crimes against humanity.” Prosecutor v. Akayesu (Trial Chamber), supra note 25, at para. 568
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
Id. at para. 590, “The victim must have been murdered because he was discriminated against
on national, ethnic, racial, political or religious grounds.”
92

Id. at para. 598, “the act [of rape] must be committed…(c) on certain catalogued
discriminatory grounds, namely national, ethnic, political, racial, or religious grounds.”
93

Id. at para. 592, “the attack must be on discriminatory grounds, namely: national, political,
ethnic, racial, or religious grounds”
94

Id. at para. 595, “(c) the attack must be launched on discriminatory grounds, namely: national,
ethnic, racial, religious and political grounds.”
95

96

Prosecution Appellant Brief, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A (July 10, 2000)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10]
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The issue before the Appeals Chamber is to determine whether this ingredient of
crimes against humanity within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, as referred to in
the chapeau of Article 3 of the Statute, requires the perpetrator to have knowledge
that his act is part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population on discriminatory grounds, or is in furtherance of the attach, or
whether this ingredient requires that the perpetrator of each crime enumerated in
the article must have the discriminatory intent to commit the said crime against
his victim in particular, on one of the enumerated grounds.97
The Appeals Chamber found that: “(1) Article 3 of the Statute does not require that all crimes
against humanity enumerated therein be committed with a discriminatory intent;” and that “(2)
Article 3 restricts the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to crimes against humanity committed in a
specific situation, that is, ‘as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population’ on discriminatory grounds.”98
In its analysis, the Appeals Chamber looked to the Tadic99 case, where the ICTY was
faced with the same issue. While the ICTY Stature does not contain any language resembling a
discrimination element, the Appeals Chamber still felt that the Tadic decision was applicable and
“[endorsed] the general conclusion and review contained in Tadic,” that discriminatory intent
was not an element of the crime (unless the crime was persecution).100 The Appeals Chamber
instead found that the term “on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds” was a
means of restricting the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to only those crimes committed as part of an
attack on discriminatory grounds.101 In this way, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction over acts that
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Prosecutor v. Akayesu (Appeals Chamber), supra note 89, at para. 459 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
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Id. at para. 469.
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Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (July 15, 1999) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 20]. See infra pp. 36-38.
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Akayesu, Case No. IT-96-4-A, supra note 88, at para. 464 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 11].
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might normally be viewed as crimes against humanity, unless they were a part of a
discriminatory attack.102 As the Appeals Chamber explained,

It is within this context, and inlight of the nature of the events in Rwanda
(where a civilian population was actually the target of a discriminatory attack),
that the Security Council decided to limit the jurisdiction of the Tribunal over
crimes against humanity solely to cases where they were committed on
discriminatory grounds. This is to say that the Security Council intended
thereby that the Tribunal should not prosecute perpetrators of other possible
crimes against humanity.103
The same sort of interpretation is logically applicable to the ECCC and its prosecution of the
Khmer Rouge.
As is stated in Article 1 of the ECCC Statute, “The purpose of this law is to bring to
trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the
crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and
custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia….”104 While the phrase “on
national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds” is fairly broad, it nonetheless serves as a
restrictive element on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Unfortunately, the documented history of
the creation of the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers is somewhat sparse,
so it is difficult to know for certain whether that was the creators’ actual intent. That being said,
the fact that the discussions surrounding the creation are undocumented may actually allow for
the Akayesu interpretation to be granted even more weight.
iii. Case Law of the ICTY and Customary International Law
101

Id. at paras. 460-469.

102

Id. at para. 464.
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Id.
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ECCC Statute, supra note 1 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
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In regard to the question of a discrimination element, there is one important case derived
from the ICTY. The Tadic Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY is important in
several regards.105 First, it provides a tribunal’s declaration that a discriminatory intent is not a
requisite element of crimes against humanity.106 Second, the Tadic judgment sets forth case law
as evidence that a discriminatory intent is not required under customary international law.107
While the ICTY Statute does not contain any discrimination element, the ICTY was nonetheless
faced with the question of whether discriminatory intent was a necessary element to crimes
against humanity in its Tadic case.108
Essentially, the Trial Chamber had ruled that, in order to satisfy the elements of crimes
against humanity under the ICTY Statute, the act must “not be unrelated to the armed
conflict.”109 As explained by the Appeals Chamber, “The Trial Chamber further held that the
requirement that the act must ‘not be unrelated’ to the armed conflict involved two aspects.
First, the perpetrator must know of the broader context in which the act occurs. Secondly, the act
must not have been carried out for the purely personal motives of the perpetrator.”110
On appeal, the prosecution questioned whether a discrimination element was actually
necessary. As summarized by the Appeals Chamber: “The Prosecution argues that the weight of
105

Prosecutor v. Tadic (Appeals Chamber), supra note 98 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 20].
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at paras. 238-272.

109

Prosecutor v. Tadic (Trial Chamber), supra note 18, at para. 634 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 18].
110

Prosecutor v. Tadic (Appeals Chamber), supra note 98, at para. 239 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
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authority supports the proposition that crimes against humanity can be committed for purely
personal reasons and that the sole authority relied on by the Trial Chamber in support of its
finding in fact suggests that, even where perpetrators may have been personally motivated to
commit the acts in question, their conduct can still be characterised as a crime against
humanity.”111
In its decision, the Appeals Chamber agreed “that the weight of authority supports the
proposition that crimes against humanity can be committed for purely personal reasons, provided
it is understood that the two aforementioned conditions – that the crimes must be committed in
the context of widespread or systematic crimes directed against a civilian population and that the
accused must have known that his acts, in the words of the Trial Chamber, ‘fitted into such a
pattern’ – are met.”112 It then went into a detailed discussion of the “case-law as evidence of
customary international law.”113 While too detailed to summarize here, the Tadic judgment is
now continually cited for the proposition that discriminatory intent is not a required element of
the customary international law prohibiting crimes against humanity.

IV. MENS REA AND THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ENUMERATED ACTS AND
THE CHAPEAU ELEMENTS
There is no mention of the mens rea applicable to crimes against humanity within the
context of the ECCC Statute.114 Therefore, the mens rea that must be proven by the prosecution
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Id. at para. 242.
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Id. at para. 255.
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Id. at p. 115
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ECCC Statute, supra note 1 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
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is that found in customary international law from April 17, 1975 to January 6, 1979.115
However, the mens rea must be at least equal to that found in the Rome Statute, as Article 9 of
the Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning
the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea mandates that the Rome Statute governs the law of crimes against humanity.116
Without such requirements, either Article 5 of the ECCC Statute or Article 9 of the UNCambodia Agreement would be violated.
Article 30(1) of the Rome Statute states that “unless otherwise provided, a person shall be
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court
only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.”117 Article 30(2) then
defines intent as follows: “For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where: (a) In
relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; (b) In relation to a consequence,
that person means to cause the consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course
of events.”118 The Article 30(2) definition of intent applies to the enumerated acts though, and
not to the chapeau elements of the crime.119 Therefore, it will not discussed in this paper.120
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U.N. Cambodia Agreement, supra note 59 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
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Rome Statute, supra note 80, at art. 30(1) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6].
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Elements of Crimes, supra note 60 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].
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While they are not specifically discussed in this paper, several articles deserve mention for
their discussion on the requisite intent. Johan D. Van der Vyver, The International Criminal
Court and the Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law, 12 U. Miami Int’l & Comp.
L. Rev. 57 (2004) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34] discusses intent at some
length, with specific sections concerning: general intent and specific intent; Versari in re Illicita;
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However, the Article 30(1) knowledge requirement does apply to the chapeau elements.
That knowledge is defined as “awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur
in the ordinary course of events.”121 It is the knowledge requirement that transforms the
enumerated crimes into crimes against humanity, and is discussed in detail below.
A. KNOWLEDGE
In addition to proving intent to commit the underlying offense for a conviction, “the
perpetrator must know that there is an attack on the civilian population and that his acts comprise
part of that attack; or he must at least take the risk that his acts are part of the attack. It suffices
that, through the function he willingly accepted, he knowingly took the risk of participating in
the implementation of that attack. The perpetrator need not know the specific details of the
attack.”122
In the Tadic judgment, the Trial Chamber discussed specifically the knowledge required
by the perpetrator of the wider context in which his acts occurred and looked to R. v. Finta for
guidance. In R. v. Finta, the majority found that “[t]he mental element required to be proven to
constitute a crime against humanity is that the accused was aware of or willfully blind to facts or
circumstances which would bring his or her acts within crimes against humanity. However, it
would not be necessary to establish that the accused knew that his actions were inhumane.”123

and malice aforethought; along with the specific intent required for certain crimes against
humanity.
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Rome Statute, supra note 80, at art. 30(3) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6]
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Mettraux, supra note 37, at 261 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
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Prosecutor v. Tadic (Trial Chamber), supra note 18, at para. 657 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 18], citing R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 R.C.S., 701
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Constructive knowledge is also sufficient, depending on the definition given to
“constructive knowledge.” The Trial Chamber in Tadic has also held that “if the perpetrator has
knowledge, either actual or constructive…that is sufficient to hold him liable for crimes against
humanity.” As Van der Vyver124 writes, if constructive knowledge “was intended to denote
cases where knowledge cannot be proven by direct evidence but may be construed on basis of
the surrounding facts and circumstances – where, therefore, ‘constructive knowledge’ is a matter
of evidence and not of substantive law – reliance on such knowledge to substantiate a conviction
for a crime against humanity cannot be faulted.”125
Therefore, while knowledge of the attacks is a substantive requirement, that requirement
can be satisfied merely through “constructive knowledge,” essentially leading to a mental
requirement of willful blindness. The importance of the ability to use constructive knowledge to
satisfy the requirement is especially prevalent in considering the prosecution’s evidentiary
burden, which is discussed below126.
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B. BURDEN OF PROOF
After having established the proper definition of “knowledge,” there still remains the
question of how “knowledge” of the attack and, in turn, the relationship between the “widespread
or systematic attack on a civilian population” on discriminatory grounds and the enumerated
acts, may be proven. The decisions of the ICTR and ICTY offer the best analysis as to how the
knowledge requirement may be proven.
First, knowledge of the attack may be actual or constructive.127 As Guenael Mettraux128
writes:
Knowledge of the attack and the perpetrator’s awareness of his participation may
be inferred from circumstantial evidence, examples of which include the
accused’s position in the military or civilian hierarchy; his voluntary assumption
of an important role in the broader criminal campaign; his participation in the
violent takeover of enemy villages; his acts of capture, detention, rape,
brutalization, or murder; his presence at the scene of the crime; his membership in
a group involved in the commission of such crimes; his utterances and references
to the superiority of his group over the enemy group; and the consistency and
predictability of his criminal acts. The perpetrator’s knowledge may also be
inferred from public knowledge, based on the extent of media coverage, the scale
of the acts of violence, and the general historical and political environment in
which the acts occurred. The indicia of knowledge should be assessed as a
whole.129

“It may be inferred from a concurrence of concrete facts, such as the historical and political
circumstances in which the acts occurred, the scope and gravity of the acts perpetrated, or the
nature of the crimes committed and the degree to which they are common knowledge. Yet, the
important distinction, which has implications with respect to the policy of deterrence, would be
left to the determination of the judicial body adjudicating a given case.” Badar, supra note 5, at
120 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
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The Tadic case also makes this clear, with the Trial Chamber holding that “if the
perpetrator has knowledge, either actual or constructive…that is sufficient to hold him
liable for crimes against humanity.”130
Moreover, the prosecutor’s ability to prove knowledge based on circumstantial or
secondary evidence is necessary. As Van der Vyver writes:
In Tadic, the ICTY in that sense confirmed that knowledge can be ‘implied from
the circumstances.’ Not every perpetrator of genocide, crimes against humanity
or war crimes boast about their evil deeds, though many do. Courts are often
obligated to construe a certain mental disposition based on secondary evidence.
Provided the possession of guilty knowledge is a sine qua non (beyond reasonable
doubt) of the surrounding facts and circumstances, a conviction for the crime
based on intent and knowledge would be fully justified.131
So while knowledge may be the requisite mens rea of the crime, the ability to use “constructive
knowledge” to satisfy this requirement is extremely important when it comes to the prosecution’s
evidentiary burden. The ability to use constructive knowledge allows for the inclusion of any
circumstantial evidence that may prove that the perpetrator had, or should have had, knowledge
of the attack.

V. CONCLUSION
The ECCC should not have any difficulty in establishing that the chapeau elements of
crimes against humanity have been met in its facts, but establishing the proper precedent is
important not only for the validity of the Tribunal but also for the future progression of
customary international law. Within the chapeau elements, there are essentially four elements
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that must be proven: (1) a widespread or systematic attack; (2) on a civilian population; (3) in
furtherance of a State or organizational plan or policy; and (4) that the attack was “on national,
political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds.
The widespread or systematic attack is the most important of the elements, but it is also
that which is typically the easiest to satisfy. Whether the Khmer Rouge’s attack was on a “vast
scale” as required by the term “widespread” or part of a methodical plan as required by the term
“systematic,” the prosecution should have no problem in proving either or both of these
elements, even though only one need be proven.
The plan or policy requirement requires that the attack be in furtherance of a state or
organizational plan or policy. Whether the Khmer Rouge’s plan was to convert Cambodians into
“old people” through agricultural labor, promote the rise of communism, other, or some
combination, history has shown that the Khmer Rouge were certainly following specific policies.
And while the Tribunal has jurisdiction only over the time when the Khmer Rouge were in
power, it may nonetheless be important as a matter of customary international law that the policy
need not be that of a State, but that the requirement can be satisfied by any organization or entity.
Perhaps the most unique aspect of the chapeau elements is the requirement that the attack
be on discriminatory grounds, whether those be “national, political, ethnical, racial or religious.”
The fact that the “discriminatory grounds” element does not increase the burden of the
prosecution by heightening the requisite level of intent of the perpetrator is already wellestablished by cases from the Tribunals of the ICTY and the ICTR. The precedent set by those
Tribunals, both in their interpretation of customary international law and in the proper way to
interpret the specific language of the statute, will be valuable to the Office of the Prosecution.
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Lastly, the factor that joins the enumerated crimes to the chapeau elements of crimes
against humanity is the mens rea requirement. As has been established through customary
international law and also in the Rome Statute, knowledge is the proper mens rea to be applied.
Knowledge of the attack, however, need not be proven directly, but rather “constructive
knowledge” can satisfy the requirement as well. This allows the prosecution to include any
circumstantial evidence which it deems relevant to proving the knowledge of the perpetrator.
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